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I. Introduction
Recognizing evidentiary privileges undermines the general maxim of our
legal system that the public has a right to obtain competent evidence.' Thus,
courts should adopt new privileges only after determining, first, that sufficient
interests exist which outweigh the evidentiary needs of the legal system2 and,
second, that adoption of a privilege is necessary to preserve those interests.3
In 1996, the Supreme Court made such a determination in Jaffee v. Redmond4
and recognized a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.5 Arguably, the
decision established a framework for determining when other professional
communications warrant privileged status under Federal Rule of Evidence 501
(Rule 501).6
The Jaffee framework provides a ray of hope for the accountant-client7
privilege, which has historically encountered disfavor in the federal court
system. In 1973, the Supreme Court noted in Couch v. United States' that no
1. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996) (stating that "public has
right to every man's evidence" (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))).
The Supreme Court noted that when it "examine[s] the various claims of exemption, [it] startfs]
with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable
of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule." Id. (quoting Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331).
2. See Steven Goode & M. Michael Sharlot, Article V" Privileges, 30 Hous. L. REv.
489, 489-90 (1993) (discussing when courts should recognize privileges); see also Jaffee, 116
S. Ct. at 1928 (supporting privilege recognition when other public interests "transcend" truth
seeking Interest).
3. See Goode & Sharlot, supra note 2, at 490 (asserting recognition of privilege must
"foster" values privilege purports to protect).
4. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
5. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996); see infra notes 98-129 and
accompanying text (discussing Jaffee).
6. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (discussing Rule 501). Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
7. This Note uses the terms public accountant, accountant, and auditor interchangeably
to refer to a certified public accountant (CPA). For a general discussion of the accounting
profession and the licensing requirements for CPA's, see DANIEL G. SHORT & GLENN A.
WELSCH, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 10-13 (6th ed. 1990).
8. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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accountant-client privilege exists in the federal courts." Eleven years later in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,'0 the Burger Court cited Couch to sup-
port its denial of work product protection to a public accountant's tax accrual
workpapers." These two decisions, combined with the perception that Rule
501 offers a conservative approach to privileges, led some commentators to
suggest that the accountant-client privilege had no future in the federal system
absent congressional action.'2 Such a conclusion proves premature in light of
Jaffee, a broad decision that creates an opportunity for recognition of new
privileges."3
This Note considers whether the majority's reasoning in Jaffee opens the
privilege door wide enough to permit an accountant-client privilege to enter
the federal courts. Part II discusses the historical treatment of the accountant-
client privilege in the federal courts, including an evaluation of both the
Couch and Arthur Young decisions. 4 Part III reviews the Wigmore approach
to privileges, a long-standing framework commonly invoked in scholarly
evaluations of privileged communications.' 5 Part IV details the rationale
underlying adoption of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee.
16
Part V evaluates the accountant-client privilege through the lens of Jaffee by
identifying private interests, public interests, benefits from denial of the privi-
lege, and the impact of state enactments. 17 This Note ultimately concludes
9. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); see infra notes 18-31 and
accompanying text (discussing Couch).
10. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
11. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984); see infra notes 32-
83 and accompanying text (discussing Arthur Young).
12. See Gaylord A. Jentz, AccountantPrvileged Communications: Is it aDying Concept
Under the New Federal Rules ofEvzdence?, 11 AM. Bus. L.J. 149, 149 (1973) ("[T]he Federal
Rules offer a conservative approach to the privilege doctrine and are a retreat from the
recognition ofpnvileged communications in numerous professional relationships other than that
of the attorney and his client."); Scot L. Kline, Note, United States v. Arthur Young & Co..
Judicial Death Knell for Auditors'Prvilege and Suggested Congressional Resurrection, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 694, 694-95 (1986) (asserting that Arthur Young decision definitively
precluded judicial recognition of accountant work product doctrine for tax accrual workpapers
and suggesting Congress should provide such protection).
13. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (suggesting framework that Court
applied to permit psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee is applicable to other privileges, including
accountant-client privilege). .
14. See infra notes 18-83 and accompanying text (discussing history of accountant-client
privilege in federal courts).
15. See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text (discussing Wigmore approach to pnvi-
leges).
16. See infra notes 98-129 and accompanying text (discussing Jaffee approach to privi-
leges).
17. See infra notes 130-273 and accompanying text (evaluating accountant-client pnvi-
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that the federal system is not yet ready to adopt an accountant-client privilege,
even under Jaffee's broad analysis.
II. Historical Consideration of the Accountant-Client Privilege
in the Federal System
A. Couch v United States
In Couch v. United States,s the Supreme Court considered the case of a
restaurant owner who, after a number of years of giving her business records
to her accountant for tax return preparation, faced an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) investigation of her returns.19 Upon finding evidence suggesting that the
restaurant owner's tax returns substantially understated gross income, the IRS
issued a summons to the accountant for the production of any of the restaurant
owner's business records in the accountant's possession.2" The accountant
refused to comply and transferred the records to the restaurant owner's attor-
ney 21 Consequently, the IRS requested that a federal court enforce the
summons.22 In response to the enforcement action, the restaurant owner
claimed that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution barred
production of the records due to "the confidential nature of the accountant-
client relationship and her resulting expectation of privacy ,'
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell dismissed the restaurant owner's
privacy claim, finding that a taxpayer has no reasonable expectation of
privacy when she transfers information to her accountant for ultimate dis-
closure in a tax return. 4 Powell noted that, although not controlling in the
instant case, federal courts do not recognize an accountant-client privilege.'
In contrast, Justice Marshall, although not directly advocating an accountant-
client privilege, recognized that disclosure to accountants is similar to dis-
closure to attorneys,26 professionals who traditionally have enjoyed privileged
lege using Jaffee framework).
18. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
19. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 324 (1973).
20. Id. at 324-25.
21. Id. at 325.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 335. The restaurant owner also claimed thatthe Fifth Amendment's protection
from self-incrimination barred production. Id. at 325.
24. Id. at 335. Powell also denied the self incrimination claim because the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is a personal one and the court was compelling the accountant, not the restaurant
owner, to testify. Id. at 329.
25. Id. at 335 (stating "[a]lthough not in itselfcontrolling, . no confidential accountant-
client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in
federal cases").




Despite Justice Powell's admission that the lack of a federal accountant-
client privilege did not control the Court's decision,2" commentators often
view Couch as authority for denying the privilege.29 Furthermore, lower
courts perpetuate this misconception by avoiding consideration of the circum-
stances of each case and citing Couch as the conclusive pronouncement that
no accountant-client privilege exists m the federal system." Rather than
applying sound legal reasoning, these courts contribute to the phenomenon of
"snowballing dicta."31
B. United States v Arthur Young & Co.
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,32 the Supreme Court revisited
the accountant-client privilege and considered whether to grant work product
protection to an accountant's tax accrual workpapers.33 To comply With
federal securities laws, Amerada Hess Corporation (Amerada Hess) engaged
Arthur Young, a public accounting firm, to review its financial statements.34
During the review, Arthur Young evaluated the corporation's stated tax
liabilities and documented its findings m a series ofworkpapers.35 Subsequent
27. See Harold N. Bynum, Note, Evidence -Privileged Communications -Accountant
and Client, 46 N.C. L. REV. 419, 419 n.1 (1968) (noting that common law only recognized
attorney-client privilege and husband-wife privilege); Charles Q. Jakob, Note, GoodBadPress:
Observations and SpeculationsAbout Internal Revenue ServiceAccountant-Informants, 54O-IO
ST. L.J. 199, 202 (1993) (same); Scott W Roloff, Note, Accountant Work-Product Privilege
Rejected: United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 38 Sw. L.J. 1123, 1127 (1985) (stating that
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) recognized attorney work product privilege).
28. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335; see also Jakob, supra note 27, at 207 (stating that Couch did
not present question of accountant-client privilege, but was Fourth and Fifth Amendment case);
Roloff, supra note 27, at 1129 (noting that Couch Court "summarily" stated that no accountant-
client privilege exists under federal law).
29. See Goode & Sharlot, supra note 2, at 490 n. 11 (stating that Supreme Court has
"held" that no accountant-client privilege exists under federal common law); Travis Morgan
Dodd, Note, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justifying Disparate
Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 GEO. L.J. 909,931 (1992) (citing'Couch
as support for proposition that Supreme Court has rejected federal accountant-client privilege).
30. See, e.g., Platypus Wear, Inc. v. K.D. Co., 905 F Supp. 808, 811 (S.D. Ca. 1995)
(citing Couch as conclusively denying accountant-client privilege in federal courts); Coastal
Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 830 F Supp. 80, 81 (D.P.R. 1993)
(same); United States v. Mullen & Co., 776 F Supp. 620, 621 (D. Mass. 1991) (same); see
Jakob, supra note 27, at 207 (indicating that courts blindly follow apparent precedent).
31. Jakob, supra note 27, at 207.
32. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
33. United States v. Arthur Young& Co., 465 U.S. 805,817-21 (1984); see Kline, supra
note 12, at 695-700 (discussing audit process and content of tax accrual workpapers).
34. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 808.
35. Id.
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to the review, the IRS performed a routine audit of Amerada Hess's tax
liability over a three year period. 6 The audit revealed a questionable payment
and triggered a criminal investigation of Amerada Hess's tax returns."
During the investigation, Arthur Young refused to comply with an IRS
administrative summons requesting Arthur Young's Amerada Hess audit
files."8 Consequently, the IRS obtained enforcement of the summons m the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 9 The
district court found that the information requested was both relevant and
unprotected by any accountant-client privilege.4"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
district court ruling and recognized a limited accountant work product privi-
lege.4 In so doing, the court resisted the trend set by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gurtner42 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in UnitedStates v. Wainwright,43
both ofwhich denied protection to accountant-client communications without
directly resolving the privilege issue." Even though the Second Circuit did
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 808-09.
39. Id. at 809.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 810.
42. 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973).
43. 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969).
44. See United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that
accountant did not have sufficient working relationship with defendant's attorney to warrant
application of attorney-client privilege to communications with accountant); United States v.
Wanwnght, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969) (noting that defendant did not claim that his
communications with his accountant were privileged because no accountant-client privilege
exists under federal law).
In Gurtner, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the tnaljudge should have stricken an
accountant's testimony in ajury trial for failure to file federal income tax returns because the
attorney-client privilege covered the taxpayer's communications with the accountant Gurtner,
474 F.2d at 298. The court determined that, because the communications were not for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and because the accountant was not acting as a consultant for
the attorney, the accountant's testimony did not constitute privileged information. Id at 298-99.
Furthermore, the court noted that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to consultations
for the purpose of preparing tax returns even when an attorney performs such consultations. Id.
at 299. Finally, the court concluded that even if the relationship between the accountant and
the defendant's attorney was sufficient to apply the attorney-client privilege, the defendant
waived the privilege by failing to assert it in a timely manner. Id.
In Wainwright, the Tenth Circuit considered the case of an individual charged with wilful
tax evasion for understating taxable income. Wainwright, 413 F.2d at 798-99. Among other
challenges, the defendant claimed that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination by permitting the defendant's tax preparer to surrender, in response to a
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not follow its sister circuits, it acknowledged that its decision dealt with a
conflict between the evidentiary interest involved in enforcing tax laws and
the interest in complete financial disclosure for the protection of securities
markets.45 Ultimately, the Second Circuit determined that the interest in
financial disclosure outweighed the IRS's evidentiary interest.
46
First, the court examined the public disclosure interest that prompted
Congress to enact securities laws requiring publicly held companies to obtain
financial statement audits by independent accountants.47 The appellate court
concluded that Congress, by enacting these verification procedures in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s intended "management [to] feel free to
cooperate withtheir auditors, and to discloseto them confidential information,
such as the questionable positions taken on tax returns, and willingness to
settle rather than litigate when these positions are challenged by the IRS."
49
The court suggested that a company might not disclose fully its tax positions
to its auditors if the IRS could have access to the information and, conse-
quently, gain the upper hand in tax litigation." Furthermore, the court found
that the only benefit of denying the privilege51 was the efficiency in IRS
investigations that would result from the IRS having the advantage of the tax
accrual workpapers' "roadmap" to the best arguments for claiming deficient
tax payments. 2 Although the court granted a privilege to accountant work
product, it limited the scope of the privilege by making it inapplicable to
extreme situations in which corporate records were otherwise unavailable.53
Afterthe.4rthur Youngdecision, other circuit courts undercutthe Second
Circuit's position on the accountant work product privilege. In UnitedStates
subpoena duces tecum, a schedule prepared by the defendant. Id. at 803. The court noted that
the defendant did not claim accountant-client privilege protection because federal courts do not
recognize such a privilege and concluded that the defendant-prepared schedules were "merely
cumulative of matters already in evidence and could not affect the substantial rights of the
accused." Id. at 803, 804.
45. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465
U.S. 805 (1984).
46. Id- at 219-21; see also Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 810 (citing Second Circuit deci-
sion).
47. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 219.
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(J)-(L) (1994).
49. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 219-20.
50. Id- at 220.
51. Cf Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (noting that one consideration
for evaluating privileges is benefit derived from denying privileged status).
52. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 220.
53. Id. at 221. The court noted that the IRS would have to make "a sufficient showing
of need to adequately justify invading the integrity of the auditing process." Id It then deter-
mined that no such showing was made in the case. Id.
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v. El Paso Co. ," the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied application of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work
product doctrine to a tax pool analysis summoned by the IRS.55 Also, in
International Horizons, Inc. v. Committee of Unsecured Creditors,56 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply
Georgia's statutory accountant-client privilege to a bankruptcy case.57 The
54. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 545 (5th Cir. 1982). In El Paso, a
corporation asserted that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected
a tax pool analysis prepared by in-house attorneys for the purpose of estimating the contingent
tax liability disclosed on the company's balance sheet. Id. at 533, 544. As an initial matter,
the court found common ground with Arthur Young and determined that the material at issue
met the relevance standard for an IRS administrative summons. Id. at 537-38. The court then
rejected each of the corporation's privilege arguments. Id. at 538-45. First, the court decided
that the attorney-client privilege did not apply because disclosure of the tax pool analysis to
the independent auditor as a part of the annual audit constituted a waiver of the privilege. Id.
at 540. It differentiated this case from Arthur Young and found that, because the corporation
itself had prepared the tax pool analysis, extension of the Arthur Young work product doctrine
to these circumstances would constitute an accountant-client communications privilege which
did not exist under federal law. Id. at 540-41. Second, the Fifth Circuit rejected work product
doctrine application to this case because in-house counsel did not prepare the tax pool analysis
for litigation purposes but to support the tax contingency on the corporation's balance sheet.
Id. at 543-44. Finally, the court rejected the corporation's argument that public policy favor-
ing disclosure under securities laws warranted protection of the materials at issue. Id. at 544.
It denied as speculative the corporation's assertion that failure to protect tax pool analyses from
routine summonses would result in a hesitancy to prepare thorough analyses and a reluctance
to turn over such analyses to public accountants. Id. The court relied on accountants' ethics
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement mechanisms to prevent such an
effect. Id.
56. 689 F.2d 996 (1lth Cir. 1982).
57 International Horizons, Inc. v. Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 689 F.2d 996,999
(1 Ith Cir. 1982). In International Hormzons, the debtor's accountant refused to produce certain
documents and workpapers, citing Georgia's statutory accountant-client privilege. Id. The
court considered whether the Georgia provision was applicable, whether a federal common-law
privilege should protect the workpapers, and whether public policy runs against disclosure
absent application of a state or federal privilege. Id. First, in consideration of Rule 501's
requirement that "with respect to an element of a claim or defenseas to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law," the court determined that the
Rule did not require application of the state statutory privilege because the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding did not yet involve state claims warranting application of state procedure. Id. at 1002-
03 (citations omitted). The court determined that application of the privilege when the action
is entirely federal-law based would inhibit both the bankruptcy court's and creditors' access to
information necessary to determine the financial condition of the debtor. Id. Second, the court
recognized that Rule 501 allows federal courts to recognize new privileges, but found no
"compelling justification" to depart from precedent which had "consistently rejected" an
accountant client privilege. Id. at 1003-04. Third, the Eleventh Circuitrejected the proposition
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Eleventh Circuit dealt an additional blow to Arthur Young in United States v.
Pennington," m which it denied an accountant work product privilege claim
in a case involving a closely held corporation.59
In addition to the circuit courts' failure to adopt the Second Circuit's
reasoning, at least one commentator, Lester Herzog, criticized the Second
Circuit's recognition of an accountant work product privilege on several
grounds." First, Herzog asserted that the appellate court failed to provide
that federal courts should recognize the state privilege under these circumstances because it
poses no significant federal policy problems. Id. at 1004. The court found that application of
the privilege would "completely undermine the important federal interest in providing
bankruptcy courts and creditors with complete and accurate information regarding a debtor's
financial condition." Id. at 1005. Also, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that even if federal
courts recognized state accountant-client privileges in bankruptcy proceedings, lack of
application of the privilege in other states or in federal criminal proceedings would still under-
mine Georgia's policy ofpromoting candid communications between accountants and clients.
Id. Ultimately, the court required the accountant to turn over the workpapers. Id.
The decision in International Horizons accords with other federal decisions requiring dis-
closure of accountant-client communications to federal agencies based on significant federal
policies. See Win. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 103-04 (3d Cir.
1982) (concluding that Pennsylvania accountant-client privilege statute did not permit
accountant to avoid subpoena duces tecum to appear and to produce documents for both anti-
trust and State law claims because "when there are federal law claims in a case also presenting
state law claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any state law privilege, is
the controlling rule"); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731,734 (7th Cir. 1962) (refusing
to apply Illinois accountant-client privilege because privilege interfered with federal investiga-
tory function and because relationship between client and accountant was not so highly valued
as to warrant privileged status); SEC v. Coopers & Lybrand, 98 F.R.D. 414, 415 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (noting that state law privilege is not invoked under Rule 501 when matter is "fundamen-
tally a federal [one] involving the enforcement of an investigatory subpoena relating to alleged
securities laws violations").
58. 718F.2d1015(llthCir. 1983).
59. United States v. Pennington, 718 F.2d 1015, 1021 (1 1th Cir. 1983). In Pennington,
the court considered whether to apply the Second Circuit's work product privilege to prevent
the IRS from obtaining a closely held corporation's tax accrual workpapers. Id. at 1018. The
court first determined that the workpapers were relevant and thus subject to the IRS summons.
Id. at 1020. The court then rejected application of the Arthur Young work product privilege to
the facts of the case. Id. at 1021. Citing the El Paso opinion, the court noted that the Second
Circuit decision essentially created an accountant-client communications privilege that was
explicitly rejected by the federal courts. Id. at 1021 n.8. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the policy conflict in Arthur Young between tax laws and securities laws was not
present in this case because federal securities laws do not apply to closely held corporations.
Id. at 1021. It concluded that adoption ofthe privilege was not necessary to strengthen the audit
process and to protect investor confidence. Id. The court intimated that such a policy decision,
in any case, should be left to Congress. Id.
60. See Lester B. Herzog, Protection of the Independent Audit Process: The Second
Circuit.Adopts a LimitedAccountant's Work-Product Privilege, 49 BROOK.L. REv. 1061,1082-
84 (1983) (criticizing Second Circuit opinion m Arthur Young).
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substantive guidelines for future application of the privilege.6 Second, he
claimed that the court failed to consider whether the privilege extended to
circumstances in which a corporation changes auditors.62 Third, he criticized
the opinion for failing to address whether the IRS could reach client-prepared
tax accrual documents included in audit workpapers.63
The Supreme Court inArthur Young did not address any ofthese deficien-
cies in its rejection of the Second Circuit's work product privilege.' Rather,
Justice Burger noted that the circuit court's formulation of a work product
privilege resembled the testimonial privilege denied in Couch.6" Additionally,
the opinion distinguished the interests involved in the attorney-client privilege
from those involved in a similar accountant's privilege.66 The Court dis-
missed the claim of possible adverse effects on securities markets from deny-
Ing the privilege and relied instead on the public accountant's ethical duty not
to issue an unqualified opinion on financial statements if management refuses
to disclose matters that are material to the auditor's evaluation.67 The Court
found that permitting a work product privilege could, in fact, harm the audit
process by distorting the essential public view that an auditor is independent
61. See id. at 1082-83 (asserting that decision leaves uncertain status of workpapers
prepared for entities such as private corporations or limited partnerships which may or may not
be subject to SEC regulation but upon whose audited financial statements investors rely).
62. See id. at 1084 (suggesting that if privilege did not extend to both current and prior
auditors, corporations would remain unwilling to make full disclosure to their auditors).
63. See id. at 1085 (stating that "[t]he Arthur Young court also left unresolved the
question of whether the privilege would apply when the auditor, in preparing the tax accrual
workpapers, relied on the client's internally prepared tax accrual workpapers").
64. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 821 (rejecting Second Circuit work product doctrine
on grounds other than those raised in Herzog).
65. Id. at 817; see supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text (evaluating Couch).
66. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18. "The [attorney] work-product doctrine was
founded upon the private attorney's role as the client's confidential advisor and advocate, a
loyal representative whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable possible
light." Id. at 817 In contrast, "[b]y certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes apublic responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client." Id. "To insulate from disclosure a
certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to
ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
obligations." Id. at 818.
67. Id. at 818. An unqualified report indicates that financial statement disclosures are
reasonably adequate. See JACK C. ROBERTSON, AUDITING 74 (7th ed. 1993). An auditor may
not issue an unqualified opinion when the scope of an audit examination has been materially
limited. Id. When management's refusal to let the auditor perform certain procedures
materially limits the scope of an audit, the auditor must choose between a qualified opinion and
a disclaimer of opinion. Id. Both opinions alert the public that disclosures may be inadequate.
See id. at 79 (providing examples of both qualified opinion and disclaimer of opinion).
ACCOUNTANT-CLIENTPRIVILEGE
of her clients.6" Furthermore, the Court concluded that access to the tax accru-
al workpapers does not provide an unfair advantage to the IRS, especially
because Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions and civil actions
permit workpaper access.69 Finally, the Court determined that the interest in
having the national tax burden fairly and equitably distributed outweighs any
benefit derived from adopting an accountant work product privilege. ° The
Court maintained that the policy choices involved in exempting audit
workpapers from IRS administrative summonses are best left to Congress."
Much commentary followed the Supreme Court's decision in Arthur
Young. Many commentators criticized the Court's reasoning and asserted that
the Court erred in failing to recognize an accountant work product privilege.72
One commentator, however, although expressing concern over the Supreme
Court's justification for denying the privilege, found the degree of public
interest necessary to override the evidentiary needs of the IRS too high to
support recognition of the privilege.73
Critics advanced several arguments to refute the Supreme Court's
assertion that failure to recognize the privilege would not affect securities
markets. First, they claimed that the Court improperly assumed that
communications between corporate management and auditors would not
diminish following denial of the privilege.74 Second, they asserted that the
68. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 819 n.15.
69. Id. at 820. The Court also noted that IRS administrative controls over the issuance
of summonses assist in assuring faimrness in the process. Id at 820-21.
70. Id. at 815-16.
71. Id at 820-21. In 1990, Senator William Armstrong (R-CO) sponsored an
unsuccessful bill to amend Rule 501 to include a tax preparer privilege. S. 2452, 101 st Cong.
(1990). The amendment did not specifically mention or imply protection for audit workpapers
because the confidentiality provision extended only to communications regarding the filing of
atax return. See 136 CONG. REC. S4275 (daily ed. April 5, 1990) (statement of Sen. Armstrong)
(stating that "confidentiality would not apply to accounting matters unrelated to tax prepara-
tion"). Noting that the IRS has an unfair advantage in tax disputes, Senator Armstrong
contended that the amendment would facilitate accountant-client communications. Id.
72. See Frank J. Magill, Jr., The Accountant-Client Work Product Privilege: United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 38 TAxLAw. 457, 465 (1985) (asserting that Court failed to ade-
quately address auditor concerns and merely adopted IRS's position); James A. Doenng, Note,
Taxation - Creation of an Accountant Work-Product Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers.
United Statesv. ArthurYoung& Co., 104S. Ct. 1495 (1984)., 68MARQ.L.REv. 155,172 (1984)
(concluding that Congress should enact statutory work product privilege in face of Court's
failure to recognize such protection in Arthur Young); Kline, supra note 12, at 725 (same).
73. See Roloff, supra note 27, at 1138 (concluding that "government's right to enforce
the tax laws is paramount" because it "must collect tax revenue to function").
74. See Magill, supra note 72, at 464-65 (suggesting that auditors began to notice unwill-
ingness of clients to discuss questionable tax positions after IRS began summoning tax accrual
workpapers); Doering, supra note 72, at 171 (noting that experience indicates that disclosure
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Court came to the illusory conclusion that an auditor will always be able to
determine when a client is not divulging necessary information, thereby
enabling her to warn the public by issuing a qualified opinion or disclaimer
of opinion.' Third, critics alleged that the Court incorrectly concluded that
all public accountants are willing to use the threat of issuing less than an
unqualified opinion to induce full disclosure by their clients. 6
Additionally, critics attacked the Supreme Court's conclusion that
recognition of an accountant work product privilege undermines the integrity
of the audit process. Although most agreed that the role of an auditor is dis-
tinguishable from that of an attorney,77 some asserted that comparing the
professions merely sidesteps the more important question of whether audit
workpaper protection best serves the public interest.7" Others suggested that
failing to recognize the privilege impairs public confidence in the audit
process, causing the public to view accountants as adversarial to their clients
rather than independent of them.79
ofworkpapers to IRS has negative impact on auditor-client communications); Kline, supra note
12, at 709 (finding Court's analysis unpersuasive because it assumed quality ofcommunication
between auditor and client would not deteriorate with IRS access to workpapers).
75. See Kline, supra note 12, at 709 (asserting that Court improperly assumed auditors
would notice diminishing communications). Determining that the client is not divulging all
material information is difficult because the failure to divulge information manifests itself
through a "general reluctance to volunteer information or to speak freely" rather than from an
"outright withholding of information." Id. at 710. Also, an audit of tax liabilities does not
involve a "complete independent source" of verification which can identify areas management
is concealing. Id. at 710-11; see also Magill, supra note 72, at 464 (noting that auditor may be
unable to detect when client is covering up questionable tax positions and asserting that clients
may engage in such cover-ups hoping their positions will go undiscovered); Doerng, supra note
72, at 171 ("[A]n auditor who does not know the information exists cannot know the
information is missing; and as a result, the auditor will not be in a position to qualify the
opinion."); Roloff, supra note 27, at 1136 ("The Court failed to consider the possibility that the
accountant might not realize management was withholding information.").
76. See Roloff, supra note 27, at 1136 (suggesting that because public accountants are
paid by their corporate clients, they are reluctant to issue less than qualified opinions).
77 See id. at 1133-34 (noting that privacy is essential for attorneys to ensure discovery
of truth and protection of party's rights, but not for auditors to express opinions to public as to
fairness of financial statements); Dodd, supra note 29, at 932 (noting that goal of audit is not
to further client's interests but to further public interests and that role of accountant is more
analogous to "role of a termite inspector in certifying that a structure is termite free" than to role
of attorney).
78. See Magill, supra note 72, at 465 ("Just as an attorney-client privilege is necessary
to achieve the goal of zealous representation under an adversary system, an accountant client-
privilege may be necessary to reach the end of adequately protecting the investing public.");
Roloff, supra note 27, at 1134 (asserting failure of comparison between role of attorney and role
of accountant does not preclude recognition of privilege when compelling interest is present).
79. See Kline, supra note 12, at 714 ("If an auditor appears to be an adversary of the
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Furthermore, critics argued that failure to recognize the accountant work
product privilege is fundamentally unfair. First, they contended that permit-
ting the IRS to review a taxpayer's tax strategies included m an auditor's tax
accrual workpapers creates an improper balance in tax litigation because the
taxpayer has no similar right to discover IRS litigation strategies.80 Second,
one critic suggested that failure to grant the privilege could cause taxpayers
to perceive the system as unfair, jeopardizing the relatively high compliance
rate necessary to preserve the self-assessed tax system."' Third, the same
critic claimed that the Court failed to consider all interests involved when it
concluded that fairness did not require recognition of the privilege. 2
The commentary responding to the Arthur Young decision raised a
number of compelling arguments in favor ofrecognizing a federal accountant-
client privilege. Unfortunately, the prevailing legal climate at the time these
arguments were advanced was not receptive to new federal privileges. Jaffee,
however, indicates a new, more favorable climate in which these arguments
could find more success.8 3
III. The Traditional Frameworkfor Evaluating Privileges
Although courts historically have shunned Professor Wigmore's ap-
proach to evaluating new privileges, 4 scholars have espoused his criteria. 5
Wigmore employed a careful analysis of the privilege issue, cautioning that
granting new privileges is contrary to the public's right to "every man's
evidence."8 6 Courts traditionally have based their privilege decisions on the
company, the public may question the credibility of audit findings.").
80. See zd. at 717-18 (stating that IRS knowledge of what client and auditor recognize as
questionable tax positions creates imbalance in litigation); Roloff, supra note 27, at 1137 (noting
that it is not practical for courts to permit taxpayer to discover IRS theories and strategies).
81. See Kline, supra note 12, at 719 (noting negative effects of taxpayers' lack of con-
fidence in system).
82. See id. at 715 (asserting that Court only identified revenue collection as significant
interest and failed to consider effect on public securities system, self-assessed taxing structure,
and volume of tax litigation).
83. See infra Part IV (discussing the Jaffee framework for evaluating privileges).
84. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 159 (noting that courts have not recognized value of
Wigmore approach).
85. See, e.g., Denzil Causey & Frances McNair, An Analysis ofState Accountant-Client
Privilege Statutes and Public Policy Implications for the Accountant-Client Relationship, 27
AM. Bus. L.J. 535, 547 (1990) (citing 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMONLAW § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); Jentz, supra note 12, at 150 (same); Bynum,
supra note 27, at 420 (same); Raymond C. Ruppert, Note, Evidence: The Accountant-Client
Privilege Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence - New Stature and New Problems, 28
OKLA. L. REV. 637, 639 (1975) (same).
86. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Jentz, supra note 12,
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status of the communicators, rather than focusing, as Wigmore did, on the
type of communication involved and the societal importance of the relation-
ship between the parties.8 7 To promote reasoned analysis, Wigmore advanced
four criteria to determine when communications warrant a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which m the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulouslyfostered
(4) The injury that would mure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gamed for the
correct disposal of litigation. 8
Wigmore's fourth criteria indicates the utilitarian nature of his approach. 9
Critics claim the framework is too malleable and that it justifies numerous
new privileges. 90
Anticipating consideration of the accountant-client privilege issue by the
North Carolina General Assembly, 9' a 1968 study summarily rejected the
privilege based on Wignore's criteria.9 As expected in any privilege debate,
at 150 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 2192); Ruppert, supra note 85, at 639 (same).
87 See Jentz, supra note 12, at 151 (noting that courts base privilege decisions on "com-
muncators involved and their respective titles" and citing Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d
459 (6th Cir. 1961) and Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), as examples).
88. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 2285. "Only if these four conditions are present should
a privilege be recognized." Id.
89. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 547 (commenting that Wigmore theory
advances arguments for recognition of new privileges based on "the assumption that a testi-
monial privilege will perform a utilitarian function by promoting more effective performance
of the professional duty").
90. See id. (stating that Wigmore's criteria can support "endless list of privileges, all of
which impede the search for truth andjustice"). Causey & McNair's analysis of the accountant-
client privilege mentions a study of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to illustrate
the pliability of the Wigmore criteria. See id at 548 (citing Daniel W Shuman & Myron S.
Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 925 (1982)). The study determined that rejection of the
privilege would not significantly deter patients from seeking help and that most patients were
unaware of the privilege even though ten states had adopted a psychotherapist-patient privilege
and forty-one states had adopted apsychologist-patient privilege. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court extended a federal privilege to psychotherapists in Jaffee. See infra notes 98-129 and
accompanying text (discussing Jaffee).
91. See State v. Agnew, 241 S.E.2d 684, 692 (N.C. 1978) (stating that North Carolina
extends no accountant-client privilege).
92. See Bynum, supra note 27, at 422,427 (noting that consideration of accountant-client
privilege was trend in state legislatures and recommending that North Carolina reject privilege
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the fourth condition was the battleground for the accountant-client privilege.93
The study cited two primary reasons supporting its conclusion that recognition
of the privilege would not result in an overall community benefit in audit
performance.94 First, the analysis contended that an auditor's ethical obliga-
tions adequately protect the public by requiring the auditor to issue a qualified
opinion or disclaimer of opinion if corporate management knowingly or
unknowingly withholds material evidence." Second, the report suggested that
granting a privilege is inconsistent with an auditor's obligation to maintain
independence." These arguments mirror those the Supreme Court advanced
in Arthur Young and thus contain the same flaws noted by Arthur Young's
critics.97
IV The Jaffee v Redmond Framework for Evaluating
Federal Privileges
One scholar who analyzed the accountant-client privilege recommended
statutory enactment of the Wigrnore criteria to facilitate a case-by-case ap-
proach to all privileges.98 Although Congress has never acted upon this
recommendation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Jaffee v. Redmond99 adopted a similar case-by-case approach to privileged
because injury caused by permitting privilege is greater than benefit gained). Bynum admits
that the first Wigmore criterion is satisfied because the privilege only protects confidential
communications. Id. at 423. He also claims that the second criterion is met because the
performance of accounting services by a public accountant requires the disclosure of "highly
confidential financial details." Id. Furthermore, he concludes that the increased reliance of the
public on public accountants is indicative.of public opinion favoring the relationship, thus sup-
porting Wigmore's third criteria. Id. Bynum is careful to note, however, that both the second
and third criteria require evaluation in light of the fourth criterion, the point at which he asserts
the accountant-client privilege fails the Wigmore test. Id. at 423-24.
93. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 2286 (recognizing that fourth criterion is only one
open to dispute in case of attorney-client privilege and that fourth criteria is often mistakenly
determined to be satisfied in case of physician-patient privilege).
94. See Bynum, supra note 27, at 425-27 (citing reasons accountant-client privilege fails
Wigmore's fourth condition).
95. See id. at 425 (stating that investors and creditors receive notice of entity's weakness
through auditor's ethical obligation to issue qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion if ade-
quate information is unavailable).
96. See id. at 426 (noting that auditor ethical standards require independence).
97. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing similar Arthur Young
arguments); supra notes 75, 79 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that auditors may
not know when client is withholding relevant information and asserting that denial of privilege
may create misperception that auditor is adverse to corporate management).
98. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 159-60 (advocating statutory adoption of case-by-case
approach to privileges).
99. 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995).
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communications between psychotherapists and their patients under Rule
501.10 This approach was short-lived, however. Upon review, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit's fact-intensive methodology under-
mined the free flow of information between a psychotherapist and her patient
by creating uncertainty as to the circumstances under which the privilege
would be available.'0 ' The Court replaced the case-by-case approach with a
broad and largely undefined psychotherapist-patient privilege that extends to
communications with licensed social workers. 102
The Court began its analysis of the psychotherapist privilege by
recognizing that Rule 501 permits the Court to extend new privileges, but only
when such extension is appropriate in light of the general principle that every
citizen has a duty to provide relevant testimony 103 The Court then examined
the privilege using four primary areas ofanalysis. "' First, the Court evaluated
the private interests involved and determined that successful psychiatric
100. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
The appellate court favored balancing competing interests in each case to determine whether
to apply the psychotherapist privilege. Id., see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1926-
27 (1996) (summarizing Seventh Circuit's rationale). In Jaffee, the Court addressed whether
the federal system should adopt a psychotherapist-patient privilege and, in particular, whether
to extend itto licensed social workers. Id. at 1925. Jaffee, administrator of the estate ofa man
who was shot by police officer Redmond, brought suit seeking wrongful death damages based
on the excessive use of force in Redmond's encounter with the deceased. Id. at 1926. Red-
mond argued that a psychotherapist privilege protected the conversations she had with a
licensed social worker following the incident. Id. The trial court rejected this argument and,
upon the social worker's failure to provide full disclosure, instructed the jury that it could
conclude that the contents of the conversations between Redmond and the social worker were
inculpatory. Id. In its analysis of whether Rule 501 permits privileged communications in the
field of psychotherapy, the Supreme Court considered private interests, public interests, the
adverse effect on the evidentiary needs of the legal system, and the states' resolution of the
issue. Id. at 1927-3 1. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the
district judge's ruling and adopted a broad federal psychotherapist privilege extending to
licensed social workers. Id. at 1931-32.
101. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
102. Id. The Court noted that because it was recognizing the privilege for the first time,
"it [was] neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in away thatwould 'govern
all conceivable future questions in this area."' Id. (citations omitted).
103. See id. at 1927-28 (noting that Rule 501 gives federal courts power to recognize new
privileges based on "common law principles in the light of reason and experience" and
implying that due consideration should be given to new privileges as they are warranted
(citations omitted)). The Court recognized that "'the common law is not immutable but flexible,
and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions."' Id. at 1927 (quoting Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933)). The Court also noted that it has a continuing
obligation to determine the viability of new testimonial privileges. Id. at 1928 (citing Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
104. See id. at 1928-32 (analyzing psychotherapist issue based on private interests, public
interests, effect on evidentiary needs of federal court system, and states' approach to issue).
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treatment of individuals is a significant interest, with confidence and trust
between the psychotherapist and her patient being necessary to achieve this
end. l"s Second, the Court recognized that extension of a privilege must serve
public interests.0 6 The majority asserted that the psychotherapist privilege
serves such interests by advancing the overall mental health of the nation. 7
Third, the opinion established thatthe evidentiary benefits derzvedfrom denial
of the privilege are modest because denial of the privilege would chill
confidential communications, especially when it was obvious that litigation
would follow the need for treatment. 0' Fourth, the Court cited state statutory
privileges granting some form of psychotherapist privilege m all fifty states
to support the "reason and experience" condition of Rule 501."9 Ultimately,
the majority granted the privilege because the states .confirmed the Court's
finding that the benefits of the privilege exceed the costs."0
The majority's decision to grant a federal psychotherapist testimonial
privilege extending to licensed social workers drew a scathing dissent from
Justice Scalia."' Asserting that the price of granting the privilege is "occa-
sional injustice," Justice Scalia attacked the opinion of the Court on several
fronts."' First, he found insufficient evidence that the mental health of the
nation represents a more compelling interest than the search for truth.i"
105. Id. at 1928. The Court compared the psychotherapist privilege to the attorney-client
and spousal privileges. Id. It concluded that "[e]ffective psychotherapy, , depends upon
an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears" and that "the mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment." Id.
106. Id. at 1929 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). The
Court once again looked atthe attorney-client and spousal privileges for comparative purposes,
asserting that complete and honest communications between attorneys and their clients and
between spouses further the public interest in "observance of law and administration ofjustice"
and "marital harmony," respectively. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1929-30. The Court feared that a failure to adopt a federal psychotherapist
privilege would undermine the purposes of the state privileges. Id. at 1929. For citations of the
state statutory psychotherapist privileges, see id. at 1929 n.11.
110. Id.at1931.
111. See id. at 1932-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's analysis of
psychotherapist privilege was inadequate to support extension to licensed social workers).
112. Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1934 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated that he was uncertain when
psychotherapy became so critical to the mental health of the nation. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
He claimed that the Court failed to support sufficiently its assertion that failure to grant the
privilege would deter individuals from seeking the help they need, noting that the increase in
the prominence of psychotherapy has occurred despite the fact that no privilege was available.
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Second, he noted serious flaws in the Court's reliance on the experience of the
fifty states."4 Justice Scalia criticized the Court's reverse preemption argu-
ment that failure to recognize the psychotherapist privilege would impede
important state policies' and explained that the state privileges vary greatly
across the nation." 6 He also suggested that, because all of the state privileges
are statutory, the psychotherapist privilege is better suited for legislative rather
than judicial disposition. 7 Third, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's casual
extension of the psychotherapist privilege to licensed social workers.' Such
an extension, he claimed, flies in the face of the attorney-client privilege, which
derives from professional status rather than the type of advice being given."9
The majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in Jaffee, when viewed
together, indicate an atmosphere open to recognition of new privileges. The
Court's willingness to grant a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 2 ° despite the
fact that the common law did not do So,121 represents an expansive reading of
Rule 501 that does not limit recognition of privileges to those granted at
common law but that focuses on the "princtples of the common law in
Id. at 1934-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1935-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scaliaassertedthatadjustmentofevidentiaryrules
in the federal system to avoid a conflict with state policies violates stare decisis because the
Court previously declined to recognize a privilege for state legislators in federal criminal
proceedings despite the fact that such protection was available in similar state proceedings. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gillock v. United States, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980)).
116. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 1935-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that five state legislatures have
not extended the psychotherapist privilege to licensed social workers. Id. at 1936 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Also, Scalia stated that a majority of the states that do permit a privilege for
licensed social workers do not do so through their psychotherapist privilege legislation,
suggesting that the majority's extension to such workers from its general discussion of
psychotherapists is inappropriate. Id. at 1938-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He compares this
special legislation for licensed social workers to that gained by accountants. Id. at 1939 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Additionally, according to Scalia, five states recognize a privilege that provides
virtually no protection at all due to gaping exceptions and the remainder of the state statutes
vary widely in degree of protection and exceptions. Id. at 1939-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that numerous illogical extensions
of attorney-client privilege result if privilege is framed as "legal advisor" privilege). Scalia
suggests that the degree of skill required to be a licensed social worker in Illinois does not
approach the level necessary to become a lawyer or a psychiatrist. Id. at 1937-38 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
120. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing Jaffee Court's approach
to Rule 501).
121. See MCCORMICK ON EviDENcE § 98 (Edward W Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984)
(stating that common law recognized no physician-patient privilege and asserting psychiatrist
and psychologist privileges derive from physician-patient privilege).
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light of reason and experience.""i2 The majority established a general frame-
work for analysis and gave some insight into the circumstances that warrant
recognition of privileges."u The dissent further defined the degree of "reason
and experience" necessary to justify a federal privilege by highlighting the
level of variance among state enactments that the majority was willing to
accept.124 The Court's analysis is also significant because it effectively
applies Wigmore's utilitarian framework and weighs the benefits of granting
a privilege against the accompanying evidentiary loss."2 Once again, Justice
Scalia's dissent is helpful because it suggests that the factual basis supporting
the Court's utilitarian analysis need not be incontrovertible. 26
The Jaffee Court's broad reading of Rule 501 opens the door to other
privileges, such as the accountant-client privilege, that courts summarily dis-
missed in the past due to common law constraints.'27 The majority's recog-
nition that Rule 501 requires consideration ofevolving circumstances suggests
that the federal system periodically should re-evaluate previously rejected
privileges. 2 ' Thus, although the Arthur Young Court applied a balancing
approach to deny an accountant work product privilege,'29 the period of more
than ten years since that decision justifies re-examination of the accountant-
client privilege.
V The Accountant-Client Privilege in Light ofJaffee v Redmond
A. Private Interests
The Jaffee Court recognized that effective psychotherapy requires an
atmosphere of confidence. 3' In so doing, the Court implicitly invoked the
122. FED. R. EviD. 501 (emphasis added).
123. Seesupra notes 101-10 and accompanyingtext (examining majority opinion inJaffee).
124. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (examining Scalia dissent in Jaffee).
125. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (discussing balancing approach Jaffee
Court applied by analyzing public and private interests involved and benefits derived from
denial of privilege); supra note 88 and accompanying text (stating Wigmore criteria).
126. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (pointing out flaw in majority's balancing
of costs and benefits of granting or denying psychotherapist privilege).
127. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 535 (stating "there was no accountant-client
privilege at common law" (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 85, §§ 2290,2332)); see also United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (supporting proposition that no
accountant-client privilege exists under federal common law); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335 (1973) (same).
128. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927-28 (1996) (indicating that Rule 501
directs federal courts to "continue the evolutionary development oftestimonial privileges" (cita-
tions omitted)).
129. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion inArthur Youngthat
balance of interests involved in accountant-client privilege weighed against privilege).
130. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
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first three Wigmore factors.' First, the Court limited its privilege consider-
ation to confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her
patient. 32 Second, it asserted that confidentiality is essential for the parties
to have an effective relationship.'33 Third, the Court relied on the adoption
of psychotherapist privileges by all fifty state legislatures as an indicator
of positive public sentiment toward the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship.
134
Similarly, one commentator concluded that the accountant-client privi-
lege successfully fulfills the first three Wigmore criteria. 135 Presumably then,
the accountant-client privilege should succeed under theJaffee private interest
test. Nevertheless, a detailed look at the accountant-client privilege in terms
of Jaffee defies this presumption.
Like the psychotherapist privilege, the accountant-client privilege meets
the first two Wigmore conditions as applied in Jaffee. The Couch Court
recognized that information given to an accountant with an expectation of
disclosure deserves no protection.'36 Thus, only confidential communications
warrant privilege protection. 37 Moreover, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct Rule 301 (Rule
3 01) supports the necessity of confidential communications in the accountant-
client relationship by providing ethical protection for client confidences.'38
131. Cf supra note 88 and accompanying text (listing four Wigmore factors).
132. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 (stating that Court was considering protection of con-
fidential communications between psychotherapists and patients).
133. See id. at 1928 (claiming that it would be "difficult if not impossible for [a psychia-
trist] to function without being able to assure confidentiality and, indeed, privileged com-
munication," and that "confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment"
(citations omitted)).
134. See id. at 1929-30 (discussing experience of states in adopting psychotherapist
privilege).
135. See Bynum, supra note 27, at 423 (analyzing accountant-client privilege by using four
Wigmore criteria and concluding first three criteria are met).
136. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (stating that privacy is not
expected when information is turned over to accountant for inclusion in tax return).
137. See Bynum, supra note 27, at 423 (stating that accountant-client privilege protects
only confidential communications).
138. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 140-41 (reproducing Rule 301 and noting need for
confidential communications in accountant-client relationship). Rule 301 states:
A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential client informa-
tion without the specific consent of the client.
This rule shall not be construed (1) to relieve a member of his or her profes-
sional obligations under Rules 202 and 203, (2) to affect in any way the member's
obligation to comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons,
or to prohibit a member's compliance with applicable laws and government regula-
tions, (3) to prohibit review of a member's professional practice under AICPA or
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As in the psychotherapist-patient relationship, an accountant must be privy
to sensitive client information in order to perform the audit function effec-
tively 139 To maintain access to such information, auditors must seriously
consider their duty of confidentiality to their clients. 4 ' The exception to the
AICPA confidentiality rule for validly issued subpoenas or summonses does
not demean the importance of confidentiality in the audit context.' Rather,
the provision is practical m that it avoids potential conflicts between account-
ants' ethical and legal duties.'42
The Jaffee Court's private interest evaluation noted the similarity
between the attorney-client relationship and the psychotherapist-patient
relationship.'43 Likewise, accounting services and legal services are markedly
similar to each other, especially when the services address taxation issues.'
Thus, granting protection to communications made to an attorney and not
granting protection to the same communications made to an accountant is
inconsistent.'45 In El Paso, the Fifth Circuit admitted that it is difficult to dis-
state CPA society or Board of Accountancy authorization, or (4) to preclude a
member from initiating a complaint with or responding to any inquiry made by, the
professional ethics division or trial board or the Institute or a duly constituted
investigative or disciplinary body of a state CPA society or Board of Accountancy.
2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, ET § 301.01 (American Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1993) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS].
139. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 142 (stating that accounting services require access
to "information about salaries, products, contracts, merger and divestment plans, [and] tax
matters"); cf Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct 1923, 1929 (1996) (noting that effective psycho-
therapy requires complete disclosure from patient).
140. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 142 (asserting that one should not break confiden-
tiality rule without good reason because free flow of information is so important to accounting
function).
141. See 2 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, ET § 301.01 (providing exceptions
to confidentiality requirement).
142. CALIFORNIA SOCIETY OF CPA's EDUCATION DIVISION, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 128 (1993) (noting that decision to disclose information in
face of subpoena or summons involves difficult ethical considerations and that accountants
should comply with validly issued subpoena or summons only after consulting with legal
counsel).
143. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (suggesting that both relationships
require "confidence and trust" (citation omitted)).
144. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 151-52 (stating that granting privilege in circumstances
when accounting and legal services overlap is "reasonable and logical" ); Ruppert, supra note
85, at 646 (recognizing accountants and attorneys perform similar services for their clients).
145. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 159 (stating that granting privilege to attorney and not to
accountant when same facts surround communications is illogical); Ruppert, supra note 85, at
648 (asserting that "[tihere is no reason why a communication to one professional should be
privileged while the same communication to a different professional is not privileged").
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tinguish accounting work and legal work in giving tax advice.146 This is not
to say that communications related to tax return preparation deserve protec-
tion. To the contrary, courts consistently have recognized that preparation of
tax returns is not within the scope of legal advice, and thus no attorney-client
privilege exists even when an attorney prepares a return.
147
However, one cannot dismiss the accountant-client privilege simply
because the attorney-client privilege does not extend to tax preparation
services.14' Attorneys enjoy a privilege for work product prepared m anticipa-
tion of tax litigation. 149 Nevertheless, although the El Paso court conceded
that imminent litigation is not necessary for work product protection, it
concluded that inside counsel's preparation of documents substantiating a
company's tax accrual amount remained unprotected because counsel did not
prepare them to aid in future litigation. 5 ' Because an auditor's examination
of a company's tax accrual involves the same type of legal analysis that inside
counsel performed in El Paso, the Fifth Circuit decision appears to weigh
against the accountant-client privilege.' In fact, El Paso did not even
address the propriety of the accountant-client privilege, but merely adhered
to a long held standard that no privilege is available when an attorney
performs an accounting function.' Although the court clearly distinguished
each profession's motivation for engaging in certain tax analyses, El Paso
indirectly supports recognition of the accountant-client privilege by highlight-
146. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982); see supra note 55
and accompanying text (discussing El Paso).
147. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 539; see also United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th
Cir. 1981) (asserting that attorney-client privilege does not apply to attorney tax preparation
services); Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (same); Olender v.
United States, 210 F.2d 795, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1954) (same); Bynum, supra note 27, at 424-25
(discussing undesirability of accountant-client privilege for tax preparation services).
148. See Ruppert, supra note 85, at 646-47 (asserting that courts should not deny
protection merely because client consulted tax accountant rather than tax attorney).
149. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (noting that "work product doctrine focuses only on
materials assembled and brought into being in anticipation of litigation").
150. Id. at 542-43 (citing United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)).
151. Compare id. at 543 (noting tax accrual analysis involves "weighing legal arguments,
predicting the stance of the IRS, and forecasting the ultimate likelihood of sustaining [the
company's] position in court") with Kline, supra note 12, at 697-98 (stating that audit
procedures for evaluating corporation's tax accrual involve evaluating legal uncertainties).
152. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
accountants, not attorneys, generally prepare tax pool analyses); Jentz, supra note 12, at 157
(stating that courts have denied attorney-client privilege when attorney was performing
accounting function); Ruppert, supra note 85, at 647 (same); see also Kenneth Winter& Robert
Carney, Dealing Without anAccountant-Client Privilege, 53 TAX'NFORACCT. 356,362(1994)
(implying that attorney can protect communication with client merely by characterizing it as
legal advice rather than tax advice).
ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Ing the similarity in the content of those analyses."'
Like El Paso, the Arthur Young Court denied protection of the work
product doctrine to tax accrual workpapers, citing the distinction between an
attorney as an advisor and advocate and an accountant as a "public watch-
dog." '154 Although public accountants performing audits must be impartial,
they nonetheless perform advisory functions.155 Likewise, an attorney's role
as an advisor to her client involves a level of impartiality 156 In fact, one
commentator asserts that recently expanded attorney liability under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
transforms bank attorneys into administrative "watchdogs.."157 Arguably
then, as both professions have evolved, their roles have become more con-
gruent.
Recognition of an accountant-client privilege would yield several inci-
dental benefits devolving from the similarity between the accounting and legal
professions. First, the privilege would benefit the courts by eliminating the
need for judicial determinations as to whether an attorney is sufficiently
involved in an accountant-client relationship to warrant protection of com-
munications or whether an attorney is performing an accounting function that
deserves no protection.5 ' Second, attorneys would profit by no longer having
153. See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543 (noting that tax pool analysis involves legal analysis).
154. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
155. See I PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 220.02 (stating that auditor
independence requires "judicial impartiality"); id. AU § 380 (describing auditor's communica-
tions with client's audit committee). An auditor must inform the audit committee about
proposed corrections to the financial statements identified during the course of the audit. Id.
AU § 380.09. Thus, an auditor must advise the audit committee of appropriate accounting
methods regardless of whether management accepts the advice. Auditors must also notify the
audit committee of any disagreements with management whether or not the parties resolved the
disagreements satisfactorily. Id. AU § 380.11.
156. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1986) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE] (asserting that attorney should give professional opinion as to ultimate viability
of claim when advising client, but may continue representation when client wishes to act to
contrary as long as activity is legal); MODEL RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1996)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES] (stating that "lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice"); id. at Rule 3.1 (indicating that lawyer is not unbounded
advocate of her client but must find appropriate basis for client's action).
157. Robert G. Day, Note, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Implica-
tions for Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability, 45 STAN. L. REV. 645,
650-51 (1993) (claiming that policy of chief legal counsel for Office of Thrift Supervision
transforms lawyers "from partisan client representatives or advocates to regulatory agency
'watchdogs"').
158. See Ruppert, supra note 85, at 648 (arguing that permitting accountant-client privilege
eliminates need for determining whether work is done for attorney by accountant or by attorney
performing accounting function).
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to concern themselves with the issue of whether the services they provide
constitute unprotected accounting functions. 59 Third, clients would benefit
by receiving better quality legal services when such services border on
accounting services because they can freely disclose information without the
fear that a court will deny protection to the communications. 16' Finally,
accountants would gain an advantage by no longer having to consider whether
they should refer their clients to attorneys for adequate evidentiary protec-
tion.1
61
Even though the accountant-client relationship resembles the attorney-
client relationship and satisfies Wigmore's first two criteria, the accountant-
client privilege falters under Jaffee's method for measuring Wigiore's third
criterion - public support of the relationship.'62 The SEC, by requiring that
public companies have an audit performed annually, has recognized that
public accountants perform an important societal function. 63  Moreover,
increased use of public accounting services evidences a positive public view
of the relationship's importance." Such evidence, however, is insufficient
to sustain the privilege under Jaffee's gauge of public opinion - the laws of
the fifty states. 65 To date, only twenty-seven United States jurisdictions
recognize an accountant-client privilege, 66 a number far short of the unan-
imity of states adopting a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 167  Granted,
the number of states adopting the accountant-client privilege is not insig-
nificant, and the lack of uniformity among the psychotherapist privilege
statutes indicates that the Court does not require a national consensus to
159. See id. (noting that attorneys benefit from accountant-client privilege).
160. See id. (noting benefit to clients by recognizing accountant-client privilege).
161. See Winter & Carney, supra note 152, at 362 (noting that lack of accountant-client
privileges causes difficulties in accountant's referral decisions).
162. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (stating Wigmore criteria); supra note 109
and accompanying text (discussing Jaffee's consideration of state privilege enactments).
163. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01 to -02 (1997) (requiring annual audit for
public corporations).
164. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 157 (indicating that accountants now offer broad scope
of services); Bynum, supra note 27, at 423 (noting increase in reliance on public accounting
services); Dodd, supra note 29, at 914 (noting that public accountants perform audits for variety
of reasons including compliance with SEC or other legal requirements, extension of credit, and
mere peace of mind that client's internal controls operate properly); Ruppert supra note 85, at
647 (stating that "role and importance of the accountant has grown as our society's financial
record-keeping has become more highly complicated and technical").
165. See infra notes 243-70 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of privilege by
states).
166. See infra note 253 (listing state accountant-client statutory provisions).
167. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (stating that all 50 states have
adopted psychotherapist privilege in some form).
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support recognition of a privilege. 6i Even so, too few states have enacted
meaningful accountant-client privileges, suggesting that the privilege fails
under Jaffee.169
B. Public Interests
The Jaffee Court employs Wigmore's fourth criteria by measuring public
interests that a privilege serves against the detrimental effect of the privilege
on the court system's evidentiary needs.170 Rather than making a detailed
inquiry into the public interests involved, theJaffee opinion merely concludes
that the psychotherapist privilege facilitates appropriate treatment of those
with mental or emotional conditions, thereby enhancing the mental health of
the nation.' Intuitively, the accountant-client privilege serves a similar
function by encouraging the free flow of information and thus enhancing the
financial health of the nation by promoting accurate disclosure."r Addition-
ally, adoption of the accountant-client privilege purportedly promotes fairness
in the tax system. 73 Although these two lines of public interest arguments
were unsuccessful m the past, Jaffee calls for a re-evaluation of them "in light
of reason and experience."' 74
1. Improved Financial Disclosures
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of the accountant-client
privilege is that it will encourage full disclosure and allow public accountants
to better serve both their clients and the public. 75 The thrust of this argument
168. See id at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting majority's concession that states have
not enacted uniform psychotherapist privileges).
169. See infranotes 243-70 and accompanying text (discussing state accountant privileges
and concluding that they insufficiently support Jaffee's requirements).
170. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 (evaluating public interests and evidentiary benefit
resulting from denial of privilege); supra note 88 and accompanying text (listing Wigmore
criteria); infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary benefit from
denying accountant-client privilege).
171. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929. The Court emphasized that the circumstances of the case
present a particular public interest in having police officers who can seek effective treatment
when necessary. Id. at 1929 n.10.
172. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 5 (asserting that audit function makes entity's
financial statements reliable, "help[ing] make capital markets efficient and help[ing] people
know the consequences of a wide variety of economic decisions").
173. See Kline, supra note 12, at 714 (suggesting that fallure to recognize accountant-client
privilege interferes with fairness of tax system).
174. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996) (citing Rule 501).
175. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 157 (asserting that privilege will promote full disclosure
to benefit both clients and public); Ruppert supra note 85, at 647 (same). But see Bynum,
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is that protection of accountant-client communications promotes an atmo-
sphere of confidence and trust which motivates clients to reveal more
information to their accountants.1 76 Accountants are then able to evaluate the
information to determine if it requires disclosure. 77 A survey conducted on
a random sample of six hundred corporate officers confirms the validity of
this argument.17 1 The study overwhelmingly indicated that absence of the
privilege inhibits accountant-client communications and that recognition of
the privilege would improve accountant-client relationships.
79
To understand the public disclosure argument, an understanding of the
audit process itself is necessary "' Quality audit services require the free flow
of information between a public accountant and her client.' Auditing
involves impartially obtaining and evaluating evidence to determine if the
amounts and representations included in a client's financial statements
accurately reflect the economic realities underlying them. 8' An auditor does
not evaluate all of the evidence supporting financial statement amounts, but
rather, based on the auditor'sjudgment, examines enough evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for her opinion."83 Auditors obtain evidence underlying
supra note 27, at 424-25 (acknowledging argument that privilege results in increased disclosure,
but concluding that nature of audit services warrants no privilege).
176. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 142 (stating that managers are unlikely to reveal
sensitive information if they cannot rely on auditors to keep information confidential); Kline,
supra note 12, at 711-12 (asserting that privilege "foster[s] an environment conducive to full
and free communication").
177 See Kline, supra note 12, at 709 (noting that auditor's evaluation of information
impacts disclosure).
178. See generally G. Stevenson Smith, Do Executives Believe They Have a Right to
PrivilegedCommunications with Thei CPAs?, 19MD-ATLANTIC J. Bus. 15 (1981) (discussing
survey of 600 corporate officers regarding their views of accountant-client privilege).
179. See id. at 19-21 (indicating that over 60% of corporate officers surveyed believe that
"potential courtroom disclosures inhibit CPA-client communications" and that approximately
75% believe that privilege "would help a CPA's relations with his client").
180. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., United States v. Arthur Young & Co.. The Implications for
Auditors, in 16TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 111, 113-15 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6694, 1984) (discussing basics of audit process
prior to analyzing Arthur Young); Doering, supra note 72, at 159-61 (same); Kline, supra note
12, at 695-97 (same).
181. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 142 (recognizing that free flow of information is
important for auditor to provide quality service).
182. See id. at 8-9 (providing American Accounting Association definition of auditing);
Dodd, supra note 29, at 914 (stating that audit involves use of evidence to verify information
on financial statements); Kline, supra note 12, at 695 (noting that audit involves testing
financial statements).
183. See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 508.08 (requiring that audit
report include statement that audit includes examination of evidence supporting financial
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many of these financial statement assertions through communications with
management." An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles
used and significant estimates made by management, as well as an evaluation
of the financial statements as a whole.' The end result of an audit is the
audit report. The report states that the accountant conducted the audit in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and gives the
public accountant's opinion as to whether the financial statements fairly repre-
sent the entity's financial position in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP).' 6 Logically, if a client feels free to communi-
cate with her auditor, the auditor will have more information to use to form
an appropriate opinion on the financial statements. 87
Although corporate clients pay their auditors, the primary objective of an
audit is to inform creditors and the investing public about the financial well-
being of an entity 188 Public companies engage auditors in order to comply
with SEC requirements." 9 Alternatively, nonpublic companies obtain audit
services to facilitate raising capital. 9 To foster the reliability of auditors'
statements "on a test basis" and statement that audit provides "reasonable basis for [the]
opinion); ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 48 (noting that audit report states that audit provides
reasonable basis for opinion)
184. See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 329.21 (stating that when
evaluating deviations from expected financial statement relationship in performance of analyt-
ical procedures, auditor should inquire of management as to differences but should ordinarily
corroborate response with other evidence); id. AU §§ 333.01,333.03 (stating that auditor must
obtain written representations from management and that "[i]n some cases," such as when client
intends to discontinue line of business, "the corroborating information by the application
of auditing procedures other than inquiry is limited"); id. AU § 334.07 (suggesting management
inquiry as audit procedure for related party test work); id. AU § 431.04 (asserting that, when
evaluating adequacy of disclosures, auditor receives confidential information without which
auditor would have difficulty making her assessment); id. AU § 435.07 (stating that auditor
should inquire of management as to methods of determining segment disclosures).
185. Id. AU § 508.08.
186. Id. AU §§ 410.01, 508.08. Four types of audit opinions may be issued: unqualified,
qualified, adverse, and disclaimer. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 68-95 (dis-
cussing reports on audited financial statements). "GAAS represent the minimum professional
standards for conducting an audit." Kline, supra note 12, at 696 n.10 (citing 1 PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS AU § 150.02).
187. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text (arguing that open communications
between accountant and client improve disclosures).
188. See ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 5 (noting that client pays fee, auditee is entity
being audited, auditee and client are generally same entity, and audits serve capital markets).
189. See Sommer, supra note 180, at 113 (noting that SEC regulations require filing
audited financial statements); Dodd, supra note 29, at 914 (recognizing that clients engage
auditors to comply with SEC); Kline, supra note 12, at 695 (asserting that various SEC
regulations require audits).
190. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 914 (recognizing that clients engage auditors for credit
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opinions, the AICPA Professional Standards (Standards) require auditors to
be independent of their clients both in fact and in appearance.' 9' Even so, the
Standards warn auditors not to assume a prosecutorial role." When per-
forming an audit of a publicly held client, a public accountant must meet a
more stringent independence requirement, but the regulations do not suggest
that accountants should take an adversarial position relative to their clients. 3
Because federal courts consistently have rejected the argument that
recognition of an accountant-client privilege aids in communications and
thereby promotes more accurate disclosures, athorough analysis must address
the disclosure argument's purported flaws. 94 Opponents of the privilege
argue that it is unnecessary for effective disclosure because an accountant's
ethical standards require her to issue a qualified opinion or disclaimer of
opinion when management limits the scope of an audit." These opinions,
they argue, inform the public that the company is not disclosing all of the
information that it should disclose 96 Furthermore, opponents assert that the
threat of issuing less than an unqualified opinion is enough to induce man-
agement disclosure.'97
purposes); Kline, supra note 12, at 695 (noting that private lenders and investors often require
audited financial statements prior to granting credit or investing).
191. 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 220.03; see Kline, supra note
12, at 697 (asserting that auditor must be "disinterested professional").
192. 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 220.02; see Kline, supra note
12, at 697 (stating that "independence does not connote an adversarial relationship between an
auditor and the company").
193. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b) (1997) (stating SEC independence
requirements); RONALD J. MURRAY ET AL., THE COOPERS & LYBRAND SEC MANUAL § 17033
(6th ed. 1993) (stating that SEC has higher independence requirements which prohibit auditor
from performing record keeping services for client, extend to certain litigation matters, and
provide "additional limitations on business relationships").
194. See supra notes 54-59, 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing federal court rejec-
tion of public disclosure argument).
195. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (asserting that
accountants cannot ethically issue unqualified opinions if management materially limits scope
of their tax accrual examination); Bynum, supra note 27, at 425 (noting auditor's obligation to
issue qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion if auditor has inadequate information); Kline,
supra note 12, at 709 (citing Arthur Young); cf Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 550
(noting that accountants are unlike other professionals who claim privilege because accountant's
business is public disclosure).
196. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818 (noting that issuance of qualified opinion, adverse
opinion, or disclaimer of opinion informs public of possible problems in company's financial
statements); Kline, supra note 12, at 709 (presentingArthur Young Court's argument that "[t]he
absence of an unqualified opinion immediately warns creditors and investors").
197 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818-19; see Bynum, supra note 27, at 425 (asserting that
management's desire to obtain unqualified opinion prompts effective disclosure).
ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This line of argument is not persuasive because an accountant's ethics
cannot promote disclosure if she is unaware that the client is not disclosing
completely "' An auditor's primary source of evidence for certain necessary
disclosures, such as those relating to management's intention to discontinue
a line of business or to refinance debt, is an inquiry of corporate executives.'99
Similarly, when evaluating tax accruals, an auditor cannot glean all question-
able client tax positions from a completely independent source.210 Knowing
that accountants cannot independently identify certain information and fearing
use of the information against the corporation in future lawsuits, management
could conceal sensitive material requiring disclosure.20' Such atactic involves
no risk to management and allows them to conceal information unless the
auditor somehow senses incomplete disclosure and threatens to issue less than
an unqualified opinion absent full disclosure.20 2 In the tax accounting field,
instead of actively withholding such information, clients could wait to develop
tax strategies until they face litigation and have the protection of the attorney-
client privilege.0 3
A second flaw in the theory that ethical standards adequately ensure
proper disclosure is that the argument assumes that accountants will uphold
their ethical standards and refuse to issue unqualified opinions when they have
insufficient evidence.2 This assumption ignores the effect that client pay-
ment of the audit fee has on the audit process. 0 5 Client compensation of
auditors is particularly relevant as audit market competitiveness increases.2 6
198. See Magill, supra note 72, at 464 (arguing that Arthur Young Court improperly
assumed that auditors would be able to detect if client is not disclosing fully); Doering, supra
note 72, at 171 (same); Kline, supra note 12, at 709 (same); Roloff, supra note 27, at 1136
(same).
199. See I PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 333.03 (recognizing that
some circumstances limit procedures other than management inquiry); ROBERTSON, supra note
67, at 1062 (noting that management inquiry is primary procedure for determining manage-
ment's intention to refinance debt).
200. See Kline, supra note 12, at 711 (stating that procedures other than inquiry will not
completely identify all "potential tax liabilities").
201. See Magill, supra note 72, at 464 (noting that corporation might hide suspect tax
positions to avoid risk of disclosure in future litigation).
202. See id. (asserting that client "may feel that it cannot lose by covering up informa-
tion").
203. See Roloff, supra note 27, at 1137 (stating that taxpayer might choose to wait to
rationalize tax positions until IRS challenges positions).
204. See id. at 1136 (asserting that Arthur Young assumed "that the accountant will
unhesitatingly bite the hand that feeds him").
205. See id. (speculating that client payment of accountant hinders issuance of appropriate
opinions).
206. See John C. Burton, The Evolutionary Revolution in Public Accounting, 52 BROOK.
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One commentator suggests that the audit market's highly competitive nature
has spawned opinion shopping, a phenomenon in which a corporation
searches for an auditor who will issue the type of opinion it wants." 7 The
importance of obtaining and maintaining client relationships m this environ-
ment may seriously impede adherence to ethical standards.0 ' Hence, audit
scope limitations may not always result in auditors issuing qualified opinions
or disclaimers of opinion when warranted." 9 Of course, this opinion shopping
phenomenon also supports the argument against the accountant-client privi-
lege, indicating that even if accountants had more information available to
them, their reliance on fees might inhibit proper disclosure.
While flawed, the argument that the audit process itself is enough protec-
tion for the securities markets is not completely without merit. The ethical
standards do require that an auditor obtain sufficient evidence to support her
opinion."' If the client materially limits the scope of the audit, the standards
require the auditor to issue a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion.2 '
Granted, under some circumstances a client may conceal information, hoping
that the auditor will not discover it.2" 2 Nonetheless, more important to the
accountant-client privilege than management's failure to disclose information
is the reason behind this failure. If management fears financial statement
disclosure of the information, privileged communications will do nothing to
encourage disclosure because an auditor remains ethically bound to issue a
qualified or an adverse opinion if the client does not agree to disclose all
necessary information in the financial statements.2"' Thus, the accountant-
client privilege encourages communications between accountants and their
L. REv 1041, 1043 (1987) (stating accounting profession operates in very competitive market).
207 See Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate
America's Search for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1077, 1103 (1987) (suggesting
that opinion shopping occurs "[w]hen a company switches auditors in an effort to improve its
financial position and surveys several accounting firms to solicit their views on specific
accounting issues to ensure that the desired result will be obtained"). Smolevitz contends that
competition creates an environment "hospitable" to opinion shopping. Id. at 1105.
208. See id. at 1109 (suggesting that opinion shopping may cause auditors to compromise
their independence).
209. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (indicating accountant's ethical duty to
issue less than unqualified opinions for audit scope limitations).
210. 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 150.02.
211. See id. AU § 508.40 (stating that scope limitations "may require [an auditor] to
qualify his opinion or to disclaim an opinion").
212. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (suggesting that clients may hide
information on chance that auditor will not notice its absence).
213. See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 508.55 (stating that auditor
must issue qualified or adverse opinion if client fails to disclose information necessary "for a
fair presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting pnnciples").
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clients only under the narrow circumstances when the client fears the detri-
mental effect of sensitive information discoverable in future litigation.214 This
future litigation concern is particularly significant for tax accrual workpapers
analyzing litigation positions.215 Auditors, however, can minimize a client's
exposure to the adverse effect of discovery of information by limiting work-
paper documentation to descriptions of procedures performed on the tax
accrual and broad conclusions as to the adequacy of disclosure.2"6 Thus, the
auditor's flexibility in documentation provides some protection against any
diminishing communications that resulted from the Supreme Court's denial
of the accountant-client work product privilege in Arthur Young.217
Critics also responded to the claim that the privilege results in better dis-
closure by asserting that the privilege is detrimental to public reliance on
audited financial statements because it interferes with an accountant's inde-
pendence." 8 This argument misses the point of the independence requirement
and improperly assumes that permitting privileges and requiring independence
are mutually exclusive concepts. It is true that the SEC and AICPA both
require auditors to be independent in fact and in appearance.2 9 Interpretation
of the independence rules, however, indicates concern over public accountants
having direct or indirect financial interests in their clients.220 Unlike the
214. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 549 (stating that recognition of pnvilege will
only enhance relationship between accountant and client in limited circumstances because
relationship is already subject to ethical confidentiality requirements).
215. See Doering, supra note 72, at 160-61 (stating that auditor must determine likelihood
of IRS audit and potential for any additional tax or penalties); Kline, supra note 12, at 709-10
(noting that tax accrual workpapers emphasize weak points in tax position).
216. See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU §§ 9326.11-9326.12 (noting
that auditor may use her judgment in determining extent of documentation in workpapers and
that such documentation may take memorandum form).
217. See Magill, supra note 72, at 464-65 (noting that communications began to diminish
after IRS started summoning tax accrual workpapers); Doering, supra note 72, at 171 (stating
that "disclosure of a CPA's tax accrual workpapers results in strained communication between
the auditor and the corporation undergoing the audit"); Kline, supra note 12, at 709 (criticizing
Arthur Young Court for assuming that denial ofpnvilege would not adversely affect accountant-
client communications).
218. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (stating that
public accountants perform "public watchdog" function requiring "total independence from the
client at all times"); see also Jentz, supra note 12, at 157 (recognizing argument that privilege
would hinder audit function by destroying public confidence furthered by independence
requirement); Bynum, supra note 27, at 426 (stating argument that privilege is inconsistent with
independence); Kline, supra note 12, at 712 (disagreeing with Arthur Young conclusion that
privilege would impair public perception of independence).
219. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (noting that auditors must be independent
in fact and appearance).
220. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (1997) (stating accountant is not
independent if she has "any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial interest"
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unquestioned practice of corporations paying for their own audit services,
which certainly raises financial independence concerns,"2 the accountant-
client privilege does not implicate the financial independence rationale
underlying the SEC and AICPA requirements. Also, because the independ-
ence standards mirror rules in the legal profession, such requirements are not
conclusively incompatible with privileged status.'
2. Fairness in the Tax System
The second major line of argument in favor of the accountant-client
privilege maintains that it promotes fundamental fairness in tax litigation by
denying the IRS access to the taxpayer's litigation and negotiation strate-
gies."2 After the Arthur Young decision, a proponent of the privilege asserted
that if the public views the tax system as unfair, noncompliance with tax laws
could impair federal revenue collections. 4 Furthermore, he speculated that
tax litigation would increase as a result of the decision.2' He theorized that
the IRS would use the tax accrual workpapers that indicate a company's worst
case scenario for tax liability as the starting point in negotiations, thus
attempting to gain a higher settlement than they otherwise would have and
inducing corporations to opt for litigation hoping that they might achieve more
success in court. 6
in her client); 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 138, AU § 220.03 (asserting substantial
financial interest in auditee or involvement in auditee decision-making impairs appearance of
independence); MURRAY ET AL., supra note 193, § 17032 (listing financial and employment
relationships incompatible with independence as delineated by SEC); ROBERTSON, supra note
67, at 128-30 (listing direct financial circumstances and employment relationships hindering
independence).
221. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (stating that client payment for audit
services is standard practice even though much of benefit of services accrues to public).
222. See MODEL CODE DR 5-103(A) (mandating that attorney may obtain proprietary
interest in litigation only under limited circumstances); id. EC 5-7 (stating that attorneys should
employ contingent fee arrangements only when beneficial to client); id. DR 5-104(A) (stating
lawyer may not enter into business position adversarial to client); id. Canon 9 ("A lawyer should
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."); id. DR 5-101(A) (stating that client
must consent to lawyer's representation if "financial, business, property, or personal interests"
might affect lawyer's professional judgment).
223. See Kline, supra note 12, at 714 (asserting that permitting IRS access to tax accrual
workpapers is unfair because it gives IRS preview of taxpayer's litigating and negotiating
positions).
224. See id. at 718-19 (citing former IRS Commissioner and other commentators to support
proposition that taxing system depends upon perceived fairness by taxpayers and asserting that
denial of privilege could result in noncompliance).
225. See id. at 719 (claiming that IRS access to tax accrual workpapers could lead to higher
level of corporate tax litigation).
226. See id. at 720-71 (suggesting that "IRS may use [workpapers] as a starting point in
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Opponents of the privilege contend that the interest in obtaining the
correct tax amount and the interest m preventing tax fraud ultimately prevail
over the fairness arguments because the government must have tax revenue to
function. 7 This argument, however, fails to address the claim that denying
the privilege adversely impacts revenues through increased noncompliance.2'
In the short-term, however, the noncompliance argument has proved invalid
because the corporate noncompliance rate in the years after Arthur Young
remained relatively stable. 9  Also, opponents claim agency procedures
restricting the circumstances under which the IRS can summon workpapers
sufficiently guarantee fairness in the system." Although this protection is
available, the procedures are not legally enforceable and continued IRS com-
pliance is uncertain."1 Finally, the validity of the argument that denial of the
privilege results in an increase in tax litigation is questionable. Even though
the number of tax cases filed in tax court from 1980 to 1990 increased by
slightly more than six thousand, from 22,009 to 28,507, the cause of the
increase is unclear. 2 Considering the fact that the anticipated effects of
Arthur Young on the tax system have proved either incorrect or inconclusive,
the tax system fairness arguments alone are insufficient to support the Jaffee
public interest analysis.
negotiations, thus attempting to force a compromise at a higher amount of tax than would have
been attempted without such information," making litigation more cost-efficient option).
227. See Bynum, supra note 27, at 425 (concluding that accountant-client privilege does
not benefit honest citizens, but instead benefits those who commit tax fraud); Roloff, supra note
27, at 1138 (asserting that government interest in enforcing tax laws and collecting revenue is
more important than benefits gained from accountant-client privilege).
228. See Kline, supra note 12, at 718 (asserting that "[e]rosion of taxpayer confidence in
fairness of the federal taxing system may jeopardize federal revenue collections").
229. Compare id. at 719 (recognizing that compliance rate in 1981 was approximately
85%) with Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate TaxEvasion, 50 TAXL.REV. 33,38 (1994)
(noting that estimates of unpaid taxes for 1992 ranged between 10-15%). The fact that the
noncompliance rate has remained relatively stable does not necessarily mean that the failure to
recognize a privilege has not had an adverse effect on revenues. Many other factors also
influence the noncompliance rate. See id. at 35-36 (listing six sources of noncompliance).
230. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1984) (noting that
IRS has "tighten[ed] its internal requirements for the issuance of summonses"); Sommer, supra
note 180, at 1124-25 (noting that IRS procedures permit summoning tax accrual workpapers
only under "unusual circumstances").
231. See Kline, supra note 12, at 716 (asserting that IRS procedures provide no legally
enforceable rights and that 1984 study showed "significant increase in IRS requests for tax
accrual workpapers")
232. See Nina J. Crimm, Tax Controversies: Choice ofForum, 9 B.U. J. TAX L. 1, 78-79
(1991) (stating increase is result of many factors including "tremendous increase in the number
of taxpayers seeking to resolve tax controversies through litigation before judges with tax
expertise").
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C. Benefit Derivedfrom the Denial of Privileges
Combined with consideration of the public interests at issue, Jaffee's
evaluation of the benefits derived from denial of a privilege completes the
analysis under Wigmore's fourth criterion. 3 The Court concluded that only
minimal benefits would result from denial of the privilege because denial
would chill communications between a psychotherapist and her client in those
cases in which litigation was likely to develop from the circumstances
bringing about the need for treatment. 4 Hence, the evidence that theoreti-
cally would derive from denial of the privilege would never come into
being. 5
The Second Circuit in Arthur Young accepted this "chilling effect"
argument, but the Supreme Court eventually rejected it. 6 The Arthur Young
Court concluded that the nature of the audit process does not permit chilled
communications because accountants must have a requisite amount of
information to issue an unqualified opmion. 7 As discussed above, however,
this conclusion fails to address those circumstances in which an auditor does
not know management is limiting the scope of the examination." s At the very
least, the Jaffee opinion reflects an openness to the chilling effect argument
not present in Arthur Young. This openness improves the prospects of a
federal accountant-client privilege.
In his dissent in Jaffee, Justice Scalia criticized the chilling effect
argument by seriously questioning whether individuals would fail to be
completely truthful with their psychotherapists out of fear of later disclosure
of those communications in court.2 9 In contrast to Scalia's claim regarding
the psychotherapist privilege, corporate executives indicate that the lack
of a privilege does in fact inhibit communications between a public accoun-
tant and her client and does have a detrimental effect on financial disclo-
233. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (evaluating public interests and
evidentiary benefit resulting from denial of privilege); supra note 88 and accompanying text
(listing Wigmore criteria); supra notes 170-232 and accompanying text (evaluating public
interests derived from granting accountant-client privilege).
234. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
235. Id.
236. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (citing Second
Circuit's conclusion that failure to grant work product protection to tax accrual workpapers
would have "chilling effect" on communications as argument supporting testimonial privilege
not recognized in federal system).
237 Id. at 818.
238. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (arguing that self-verifying nature
of audit process is not complete protection against client's failure to disclose relevant informa-
tion).
239. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sures.240 Because corporate executives are often the source of accountant-
client communications, they are in a good position to judge how the lack of
a privilege affects those communications.241 Thus, the chilling effect argu-
ment is supportable in the accountant-client context, making way for a conclu-
sion that the interests in granting the privilege outweigh the minimal costs to
the evidentiary system. Of course, the experience of the states must buttress
this conclusion.242
D. State Statutory Privileges
After weighing the benefits of granting the psychotherapist privilege
against the costs, the Jaffee Court turned to the states for confirmation of its
conclusion.243 Giving considerable weight to the fact that all fifty states had
granted apsychotherapistprivilege andthatavastmajorityhad extended apriv-
ilege to licensed social workers, the Court expressed concern that a failure to
adopt a federal privilege would frustrate the purposes of state enactments.2"
The fact that the scope of the privilege varies from state to state did not affect
the majority's conclusion.245 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the con-
sensus among the states was "reinforced" by the fact that the psychotherapist
privilege was among the nine specific privileges suggested by the 1972 Judi-
cial Conference Advisory Committee prior to Congress's adoption of Rule
501.246
Justice Scalia's dissent inJaffee accentuates the level of deviation among
the state privilege statutes extending to licensed social workers, thus indi-
cating the minimal level of consensus that the majority was looking for to
support its own cost-benefit analysis.247 Justice Scalia noted that although all
240. See Smith, supra note 178, at 21 (indicating that approximately 60% of corporate
executives believe lack of privilege inhibits communications and only 22% believe that lack of
privilege does not inhibit financial disclosures).
241. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that management inquiry is source
of audit evidence).
242. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30 (indicating that "decisions of the States bear on the
question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an
existing one" (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980))).
243. Id. at 1929-30.
244. Id. at 1930.
245. Id. at 1930 n.13; see id. at 1935-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing unanimity of
state judgments regarding psychotherapist privilege).
246. Id. at 1930; see R. EVID. FOR U.S. CT. & MAG., 56 F.R.D. 183,230-61 (1972) (listing
proposed federal rules of evidence, including privileges for required reports, attorney-client,
psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, clergyman-communicant, political vote, trade secrets,
state secrets and other official information, and identity of informer); see also Goode & Sharlot,
supra note 2, at 494 n.17 (listing proposed privileges).
247. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1935-40 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
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fifty states permit a psychotherapist privilege, five states do not extend the
privilege to licensed social workers.24 Also, Justice Scalia asserted that four
state statutes include so many exceptions that they hardly constitute a privi-
lege.249 Additionally, he argued that the Washington statute does not truly
provide a privilege because it requires disclosure in response to a subpoena.2
Finally, Justice Scalia revealed that the states adopting substantial privileges
for licensed social workers include varying exceptions that make the privilege
inapplicable under certain circumstances. 2-5
Like the statutes extending a privilege to licensed social workers, state
accountant-client privileges vary considerably 2 Currently, twenty-six states
and Puerto Rico grant some form of accountant-client privilege. 3 Of those
twenty-seven United States jurisdictions, thirteen merely codify an accoun-
(discussing variations in statutory psychotherapist privileges).
248. See id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "that five of the state legislatures that
have seen fit to enact 'some form' of psychotherapist privilege have elected not to extend any
form of privilege to social workers").
249. See id. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to majority's citation of balancing
approach to privileges granted by Maine, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia); see
also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7005 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.7 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992).
250. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see WASH. REv. CODE §18.19.180
(1994).
251. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct at 1939-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that state statutory
licensed social worker privileges include exceptions for cases involving homicide, crimes
inflicting injuries upon persons, violations of any law, and harmful acts).
252. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 53 5 (noting that state accountant-client privi-
leges vary both in scope and in exceptions); Jentz, supra note 12, at 152 (stating that "statutes
vary considerably both in substance and in statutory construction"); Bynum, supra note 27, at
422 (noting substantial variations among statutes); Ruppert, supra note 85, at 639 (asserting that
statutes are not uniform).
253. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (West 1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-90-107(1)(f) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-281j (West Supp. 1997); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 473.316 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-3-32 (1994 & Supp.
1997); IDAHO CODE § 9-203A (1990); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450/27 (West 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 25-2.1-14-1, 25-2.1-14-2 (Michie 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (1991 &
Supp. 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 325.440 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:87
(West 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 12279 (West 1964); MD. CODEANN., CTS. & JuD.
PROC. § 9-110 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87E (West 1996 & Supp. 1997);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.713 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODEANN. § 73-33-16
(1972); MO.ANN. STAT. § 326.151 (West 1989); MONT. CODEANN. § 37-50-402 (1997);NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 49.185,49.205 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (Michie 1978); 63 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9.1 Ia (West 1968 & Supp. 1995); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1988); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-3.1-23 (1956); TENN. CoDEANN. § 62-1-116 (1997); Tex. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
41a-1 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 82 (1989 & Supp. 1997); WASH.
REV. CODEANN. § 18.04.405 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
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tant's ethical confidentiality rule either by containing an exception for validly
issued subpoenas or by making the privilege inapplicable to court proceed-
ings. 4 Thus, only fourteenjurisdictions offer privileges that protect account-
ant-client communications from discovery in court proceedings.2" Even these
fourteenjurisdictions vary m their approaches. Some grant a very broad privi-
lege, whereas others provide exceptions for criminal proceedings, bankruptcy
proceedings, disciplinary matters, compliance with professional standards,
or civil proceedings in which the information is vital to the defense of the
accountant.2
Courts have interpreted the meaningful privilege statutes somewhat con-
sistently First, state courts have recognized that the purpose of the statutes
is to enhance accounting services by permitting the free flow of information
between an accountant and her client without fear of future disclosure in
254. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-281j
(West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 325.440 (Michie 1995); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 37:87 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 12279 (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87E (West 1996 & Supp. 1997);
Miss. CODEANN. § 73-33-16 (1972); MONT. CODEANN. § 37-50-402 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 5-3.1-23 (1956); TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT.ANN. art. 41a-1 (West 1969 & Supp. 1998); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 82 (1989 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 18.04.405 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1997); see also Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 538 (noting that those states with
exceptions for valid subpoena or summons convert privilege to statutory confidentiality rule);
Jakob, supra note 27, at 202 (same).
255. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 538-39 (noting that only fifteen juris-
dictions have privileges bamng court testimony); Jakob, supra note 27, at 203 (stating that
"fifteen statutes, however, create a testimonial privilege"). Since these two articles were
written, Kansas revised its statute to include an exception for a validly issued subpoena,
reducing the number of"true" privilege states to fourteen. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (1991
& Supp. 1996) (providing that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as limiting the
authority of this State or of the United States or any agency of this state or of the United States
to subpoenabooks or accounts, financial records, reports or working papers or other documents
and use such information in connection with any investigation, public hearing or court pro-
ceeding").
256. See Causey & McNair, supra note 85, at 539 (noting that privilege statutes may
contain no exceptions or may contain "exceptions for criminal proceedings, disciplinary matters,
or professional standards"); Jentz, supra note 12, at 152-53 (citing some statutes that define
privilege broadly and others that include exceptions for criminal actions, bankruptcy actions,
or actions where information is material to accountant's defense); Ruppert, supra note 85, at
640 (same); cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(f) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 473.316 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODEANN. § 43-3-32 (1994 & Supp. 1997); IDAHO
CODE § 9-203A (1990); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450/27 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 25-2.1-14-1,25-2.1-14-2 (Michie 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 112, § 87E (West 1996
& Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 339.713 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 326.151 (West 1989); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 49.185, 49.205 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-6-6 (Michie 1978); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9.11 a (West 1968 & Supp. 1995); P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1-116 (1997).
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litigation." According to some, the purpose behind the privilege is analo-
gous to the purpose behind the attorney-client privilege.2 s Second, states
have narrowly construed the statutory privileges because the common law
did not recognize an accountant-client privilege. 9 Third, all states except
for Illinois have held that the client holds the right to exercise the privi-
lege.260 Fourth, courts have held the privilege inapplicable to ongoing or
future crimes.261
Overall, judicial interpretations of statutory accountant-client privileges
are relatively sparse and deal with different issues.262 For instance, in Illinois
and Pennsylvania, the privilege is only available to accountants registered
under their respective state laws. 263 Additionally, both states recognize that
application of the privilege rests on whether the parties rely on the statutory
257 See, e.g., Neusteter v. District Ct., 675 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1984) (stating that purpose
of statute is to protect client confidences and encourage transmission of information without fear
of disclosure in future litigation); Gearhart v. Etheridge, 208 S.E.2d 460, 461 (Ga. 1974)
(same); Ernst & Ernstv. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co., 381 N.E.2d 897,902 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978) (same); Dixon v. Bennett, 531 A.2d 1318, 1329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (same);
McNair v. Eighth J. Dist. Ct., 885 P.2d 576,578 (Nev. 1994) (same); Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tenn. 1991) (same).
258. See In re October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, 530 N.E.2d 453, 457 (11. 1988) (finding
attorney-client privilege similar to statutory accountant-client privilege because both cover
confidential communications and encourage full disclosure); Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1991) (concluding that relationship between
accountant and employer is similar to that between attorney and client, thus requiring "highest
personal trust and confidence"). But see First Community Bank v. Kelley, Hardesty, Smith &
Co., 663 N.E.2d 218, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (claiming that attorney's duty to be zealous
advocate distinguishes her from accountant).
259. See, e.g., Rubin v. Katz, 347 F Supp. 322, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (asserting narrow
construction of accountant-client privilege statutes because they are in derogation of common
law); First Community Bank, 663 N.E.2d at 221-22 (same); In re A Special Investigation
# 202, 452 A.2d 458, 462 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (same); People v. Simon, 436 N.W.2d
695, 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same); McNair v. Eighth J. Dist. Ct., 885 P.2d 576, 578 (Nev.
1994) (same).
260. See Dale R. Crider, The Contours of the Illinois Accountant's Privilege, 81 ILL. B.J.
92, 92 (1993) (stating that Illinois privilege belongs to accountant and not client); Jentz, supra
note 12, at 153 (noting that privilege is generally client's); cf Ruppert, supra note 85, at 640
(stating that allowing accountant to exercise privilege does not conform to policy behind
privilege).
261. See Causey &McNair, supra note 85, at 541 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554 (1989)).
262. See Jentz, supra note 12, at 154 (noting limited number ofjudicial interpretations of
accountant-client privilege statutes); Ruppert, supra note 85, at 641 (same).
263. See Martin R. Bartel, Pennsylvania's Accountant-Client Privilege: An Asset with
Liabilities, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 613, 618 (1992) (noting that Pennsylvania privilege is only
available to those accountants holding state license); Crider, supra note 260, at 92 (stating that
privilege is only available to accountants licensed in Illinois).
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protection.2" Also, in Pennsylvania, although no privilege extends to dis-
closures required by auditing standards, the statute appears to protect docu-
ments underlying those disclosures.265 Colorado courts extend a good cause
exception to the privilege m shareholder derivative actions.266 Furthermore,
Florida recognizes an exception to the accountant-client privilege when two
clients retain an accountant in common, regardless of whether the two clients
were present at the time of the communication in question.267
As indicated above, these variations among the state privileges do not
preclude recognition of a federal privilege underJaffee.2 6' However, the sheer
numerical difference between the fourteen states offering meaningful account-
ant-client privileges and the forty states enacting appreciable licensed social
worker privileges weighs against recognition of a federal accountant-client
privilege at this time.269 Such a limited number of state enactments insuffi-
ciently supports the Jaffee approach to the "reason and experience" require-
ment of Rule 501.270 Additionally, the privilege lacks the support of the 1972
Advisory Committee, which did not recommend a federal accountant-client
privilege.27i The Advisory Committee also did not recommend a privilege
applying to licensed social workers.272 Nonetheless, the Court's extension of
the privilege to licensed social workers through analysis of the psychothera-
264. See Bartel, supra note 263, at 620 (stating that Pennsylvania statute requires
expectation of applicability to communications); Crider, supra note 260, at 94 (discussing
case in which statute did not apply because accountants did not appear to rely on Illinois
privilege).
265. Bartel, supra note 263, at 627; see 63 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9.1Ia (West 1968 &
Supp. 1995) (Pennsylvania accountant-client privilege).
266. Neusteter v. District Ct., 675 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1984); see also Alan W Anderson &
Elizabeth E. Brown, Colorado's Accountant-Client Privilege, 24 COLO. LAW. 283, 284-85
(1995) (discussing Neusteter).
267. Transmark, USA, Inc. v. State Dep't of Ins., 631 So. 2d 1112, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
268. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.(noting variations in state psycho-
therapist privileges).
269. See Jaffeev. Redmond, 116 S. Ct 1923,1939 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting
that ten states have "illusory" privilege for licensed social workers).
270. See id at 1929 (noting that fifty states had enacted psychotherapist privilege,
indicating consensus for "reason and experience" purposes); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
Federalism and Federal Rule ofEvidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice ofLaw, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1781, 1823-24 (1994) (asserting that because majority of states have not enacted
accountant-client privileges, accountant-client privilege is easy case in which to find that federal
enforcement interests are paramount to state privilege interests).
271. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (noting that Jaffee Court found Advisory
Committee's recommendations persuasive in psychotherapist context and listing those priv-
ileges recommended by Committee).
272. See supra note 246 (listing privileges suggested by Advisory Committee).
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past privilege provides a basis for the social worker privilege m the Advisory
Committee recommendations that the accountant-client privilege does not
have.273
VI. Conclusion
Jaffee indicates anew approach to granting privileges under Federal Rule
of Evidence 501, that appears to be evolving toward that used by Wigmore.
Nonetheless, the federal system is not ready for the accountant-client
privilege. Arguably, significant public and private interests exist in favor of
the privilege. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is now amenable to the
chilling effect argument that granting the privilege only minimally affects the
evidentiary system. Nevertheless, a majority of the states remain unconvinced
that the benefits of a meaningful accountant-client privilege exceed the costs.
Unless and until these state legislators change their minds, the federal system
will refuse to recognize an accountant-client privilege, and Couch's dicta will
continue to snowball.274
273. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 (asserting that psychotherapist privilege covers
"licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy").
274. See Jakob, supra note 27, at 207 (asserting that federal courts create phenomenon of
"snowballing dicta" by consistently citing Couch as authority to deny accountant-client pnvi-
lege).
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